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Abstract 
This paper examines the assumptions of the Slippery Slope Framework using cross-country data; an area which has been 
neglected since the emergence of the framework in 2008. Several studies in this area have tested the assumption of the 
framework using primary data collected through survey with students or real taxpayers as subjects. Hence, this study tests these 
assumptions using statistical data generated from an institutional database. The empirical result from our sample indicates that 
trust in and power of authorities strongly interacts in explaining tax compliance. 
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1.  Introduction 
The deterrence models fail to explain fully why taxpayers pay tax even if there is no enforcement (Torgler, 
2002, 2003). The proponents of the models (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973), proposed that 
deterrence variables, i.e., tax audit and sanctions, explain tax compliance. Though these variables remain 
significant, however, the concept of psychological tax contract has been introduced to provide more insights into 
why individuals pay tax without enforcement (Feld & Frey, 2007; Torgler, Demir, Macintyre, & Schaffner, 2008). 
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Thus, the Slippery Slope Framework has been introduced to provide robust explanation (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 
2008). The proponents of the framework hypothesized that both trust and power interact (moderate) in explaining 
tax compliance. The emergence of this framework has led to researchers, especially in Europe, testing its 
assumptions (Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013; Kirchler, et al., 2008; Kirchler, Hofmann, & 
Gangl, 2012; Kogler et al., 2012).  
The current study is important in three ways: First, studies to test the assumptions of the framework have used 
either students or real taxpayers as subjects. Scant literature is available that examines such assumptions using 
cross-country data, although there is some evidence that cross-country data has been used in tax compliance 
studies (Halla, 2012; Porcano, Tsakumis, & Curatola, 2011; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; G. Richardson, 2006). 
Therefore, this study uses cross-country data to fill the void in the literature. Second, the study tests whether trust 
and power moderate each other as hypothesized by the proponents of the framework. This is important, as previous 
tax compliance studies have neglected the test of the moderation effect in cross-country analysis. Finally, it also 
provides evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa regarding the Slippery Slope Framework, which is currently lacking. 
Section two of the paper reviews relevant available literature that tests the assumption of the slippery slope 
framework. Section three discusses the methodology used to conduct the study. In the fourth section, the analysed 
results are presented. Finally, a conclusion is drawn.  
 
2.  Tax compliance  
 
Tax compliance is defined as the reporting of all incomes and tax payments to the relevant tax authority in a 
timely manner using the applicable tax laws and regulations, as well as court orders (Jackson & Milliron, 1986). It 
can also be defined as an individual’s “act of filing tax returns, declaring all income accurately for tax purposes 
and paying tax liabilities on the due dates as stipulated by the authority or applicable tax laws” (Palil & Mustapha, 
2011). Tax compliance is divided into two perspectives: administrative compliance, i.e., adherence to applicable 
tax laws; and judicious compliance, i.e., in terms of accurate completion of tax returns (Chow, 2004). Tax 
compliance can take two forms: Voluntary and Enforced tax compliance. Voluntary tax compliance is defined as “ 
timely filing and reporting of required tax information, the correct self-assessment of taxes owed and the timely 
payment of those taxes without enforcement action” (Silvani & Baer, 1997, p. 11). It can be deduced that in 
voluntary tax compliance, taxpayers pay tax willingly without enforcement action by assessing himself/herself and 
paying the correct amount of his/her tax liability to the relevant authority, using appropriate procedure under the 
relevant laws and regulations. However, enforced compliance can be described as a situation in which taxpayers’ 
willingness to pay tax is as a result of fear of detection. Voluntary compliance is achieved through trust, while 
enforced compliance is through power. Therefore, this study investigates how trust and power affect tax 
compliance in both direct and interactive relationships.  
  
2.1 The concept of slippery slope framework  
 
In an effort to understand how tax compliance is explained by deterrence and non-deterrence variables, the 
slippery slope framework has been introduced into tax compliance studies (Kirchler, et al., 2008). The framework 
tries to explain why taxpayers pay tax through deterrence and non-deterrence measures. The framework presents 
four assumptions, i.e., tax compliance can be explained by: 1) high trust and low power; 2) high power and low 
trust; 3) high power and high trust; and 4) the interaction of both power and trust as they moderate each other. 
Trust in authority means that taxpayers perceive that the authorities are compassionate and act in such a way to 
benefit the general public; their decisions are always for the benefit of common citizens. This means that 
authorities always act in such a manner that ensures good governance, which can free the society from corrupt 
practices. On the other hand, power of authorities refers to taxpayers’ perception of the ability of tax officers to 
detect illegal tax noncompliance, through rigorous audit to detect evasion; and the authorities’ power to fine the 
evaders.  
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2.2 Prior research on the empirical analysis of the slippery slope framework 
 
To confirm the assumptions of the slippery slope framework, the first empirical analysis was conducted two 
years after its introduction (Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010). The authors tested the main hypotheses of the 
slippery slope framework in two experiments using students and self-employed taxpayers. The results from the two 
samples showed that voluntary tax compliance is high when the authorities are trustworthy. Similarly, Kastlunger 
et al. (2013) tested the assumptions of the slippery slope framework through model testing. Their work improved 
the existing evidence about the framework by distinguishing coercive power from legitimate power. Their study 
correlated tax evasion as a dependent variable with five independent variables: enforced tax compliance, voluntary 
tax compliance, legitimate power, coercive power and trust. The result showed that trust in authorities improves 
voluntary compliance, and voluntary tax compliance has a strong negative relationship with tax evasion. A similar 
result was obtained by Muehlbacher et al. (2011) who also found the combined effect of trust and power on tax 
compliance. 
Additionally, assumptions of the slippery slope framework were tested in four European countries (Kogler, et 
al., 2012). The study tested the mediation effect of voluntary tax compliance, enforced tax compliance and 
strategic tax compliance on the relationship between tax compliance behaviour and its three determinants: trust, 
power and country. Results indicated that the assumptions of the framework hold in those four countries. In a 
similar study, Pellizzari & Rizzi (2013) presented a more robust model with heterogeneous agents who maximized 
their individual utility based on after-tax income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. The 
study extended the slippery slope framework by using more improved measures of voluntary compliance called 
citizenship. The model depicted the relationship between tax compliance as a dependent variable and citizenship 
(perception of public expenditure, peer influence, risk aversion, morality) and power as independent variables. The 
result showed that the independent variables have an effect on tax compliance. However, citizenship had more 
influence on compliance than power.  
Findings from these studies show that tax compliance can be explained by the existence of both trust and 
power, and the interaction between them. However, previous studies used primary data collected via 
questionnaires. No attempt has been made to test these assumptions using cross-country data, although as indicated 
earlier, some cross-country data is evident in tax compliance studies (Halla, 2012; Porcano, et al., 2011; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004; G. Richardson, 2006; M. Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Therefore, this study intends to use a 
different research dimension to test the framework’s assumptions. Hence, the following hypotheses are developed 
under the cross-country approach: 
H1 Trust in authorities is significantly related to tax compliance. 
H2 Power of authorities is significantly related to tax compliance. 
H3 Trust in authorities and power of authorities have joint significant relationship with tax compliance. 
H4 Trust in authorities and power of authorities moderate each other in the relationship with tax compliance 
 
3.  Methodology  
 
This section presents the methodology used to conduct this study. Specifically, the section discusses the 
population, sample, variables and its measurement, data as well as the research model. 
 
3.1 Population and sample 
 
The study comprises a population of 49 African countries as disclosed by the World Bank Group (WBG) 
(2012). Of these 49 countries, 29 serve as sample for the study. Nine countries did not fit in the study due to 
inconsistent data; 11 countries were deleted for being outliers. Thus, we arrived at a final sample of 29 countries. It 
is noted that in a regression model, a sample of 10-15 observations for each predicator variable can allow a good 
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estimate of the model (Babyak, 2004). This study has two predicator variables and the number of observations is 
29 countries; hence, it meets the minimum requirement as noted by Babyak (2004). 
 
3.2 Variables and variable measurement 
 
The dependent variable, tax compliance (TC) was measured using tax as percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) for all the countries in our sample. The data was sourced from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
World Fact Book for 2012. Scores of 1-10 from the cross-country data were generated by dividing tax as 
percentage of GDP by 100 and multiplying by 10. Therefore, the scores ranged from 1-10, where 10 signified high 
compliance and 1 signified low compliance. 
For the first independent variable, i.e., trust (TRUST), Transparency International (TI) and Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) were used as proxies. Similar studies on cross-country analysis, such as (Kastlunger, et al., 
2013; Torgler, Schaffner, & Macintyre, 2007; Torgler & Schneider, 2009) used the same indicators as proxies of 
trust. 
For the second independent variable, i.e., power (POWER), the Rule of Law was used as a proxy based on 
definition of power by the WBG, as contained in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (2012). 
(Kastlunger, et al., 2013) used a similar indicator as proxy to compare Austria with other European countries in 
terms of power of authorities. The Rule of Law was measured in WGI based on the methodology used by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010).   
 
3.3 Data 
 
The data was sourced from three different databases. For tax compliance, i.e., tax as percentage of GDP as a 
proxy, data was sourced from the United States (US) CIA database (2012). CPI data which was used as a proxy of 
trust in authorities was sourced from the TI report (2012). Lastly, the Rule of Law data which was used as a proxy 
for power was sourced from the WBG report also for (2012).  
 
3.4 Research models 
Therefore, from the above variables, the following models were formulated:  
TC i = β 0 + β 1 TRUST i + µ i  (1) 
TC i = β 0 + β 1 POWER i + µ i (2) 
TC i = β 0 + β 1 TRUST i + β 2 POWER i + µ i  (3) 
TC i = β 0 + β 1 TRUST i + β 2 POWER i + β 3 POWER X TRUST i + µ i  (4) 
Where TC i is tax compliance rating for a country, β0 constant, TRUST is the trust in authorities, POWER is 
power of authorities and µ the error term.  
 
4.  Result and discussions 
 
Table 1 presents the regression results of trust and power independently, the joint effect of trust and power and 
the interaction effects of trust and power.  
 
Table 1. Regression Analysis 
Independent 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Trust Individually) 
Model 2 
(Power Individually) 
Model 3 
(Trust and Power) 
Model 4 (Interaction 
Effect) 
Constant 0.010 (2.782)* 0.000 (8.262)* 0.001 (3.842)* 0.000 (4.206)* 
Trust 0.354 (0.944) NIL 0.035 (-2.227)* 0.018 (-2.532)* 
Power NIL 0.095 (1.733) 0.012 (2.702)* 0.010 (2.788)* 
Power X Trust NIL NIL NIL 0.026 (2.358)* 
R2 3% 10% 24.4% 39.2% 
R2 Adjusted -0.04% 0.67% 18.9% 31.9% 
F 0.891 3.002 4.201* 5.364* 
F test significance 0.354 0.095 0.026* 0.005* 
Note. Dependent Variable: TC. * Significant at α = 0.05 
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In Table 1, model 1 presents the result of the relationship between TRUST and TC for testing hypothesis one. 
The results for H1 show insignificant relationship between TRUST and TC at 0.05 (t = 0.944, p = 0.357). This does 
not support our hypothesis that trust is significantly related to tax compliance. The result is consistent with the 
assumption of the slippery slope framework that tax compliance is explained by a combination of trust and power 
(Kirchler, et al., 2008). Equally, R2 is found to be very weak (-0.04). Cohen (1988) has pointed out that R2 for 
single predictor variable is weak if it is 0.02 and below, moderate if it is 0.13 and substantial if it is 0.26 and 
above.  
Likewise, for H2, model two presents the result on the relationship between POWER and TC, which is also 
insignificant at 0.05 (t = 1.733, p = 0.095). Similar to H1, the result is consistent with the assumption of the 
slippery slope framework that tax compliance is explained by a combination of trust and power. Similarly, the R2 
of 0.067 is not up to 0.13 for the moderate range, as indicated by Cohen (1988).  
Furthermore, for H3, model three presents the result on the relationship between TRUST, POWER and TC 
which is significant at 0.05 (t = -2.227, p = 0.035) for TRUST and TC, and t = 2.702, p = 0.012, for POWER and 
TC. This confirms our hypothesis that TRUST and POWER are significantly related to TC. This is consistent with 
the assumption of the slippery slope framework that combination of TRUST and POWER (high trust/low power, 
low trust/high power or high trust/high power) can explain TC (Kirchler, et al., 2008). Moreover, R2 has improved 
from weak to moderate (0.189), as it exceeds the threshold of 0.13. 
Lastly, for H4, model 4 presents the result of moderating/interaction effect of TRUST and POWER in relation 
to TC, which is found to be positive and significant at 0.05 (t = 2.358, p = 0.026). Apart from p and t values which 
have improved compared to those in other models, other statistics confirm this moderating effect. For instance, R2 
in this model is higher than that of the other models; it is found to be substantial (0.319), as it is greater than the 
threshold of 0.26. The result is consistent with the assumption of the slippery slope framework that TRUST and 
POWER moderate each other (Kirchler, et al., 2008). To a certain extent, the results from these analyses depict a 
significant level of reliability based on results from similar studies (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; G. Richardson, 2006, 
2008). 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This study examines the assumptions of the slippery slope framework using cross-country data. More 
specifically, it examines the moderating effect of trust and power in explaining tax compliance as proposed by the 
framework. The findings from the study show that the assumptions of the slippery slope framework hold even in 
empirical cross-country analysis. It also shows that there is strong interaction effect between trust and power in 
explaining tax compliance. Further, it shows that the presence of trust in authorities alone without power of 
authorities to detect evasion and punish evaders, may not improve tax compliance. Similarly, the power of 
authorities alone, without trust in authorities by citizens, also may not improve tax compliance. The result clearly 
indicates that tax compliance improves through the combination of trust in and power of authorities. By 
implication, if African countries are so concerned with improving tax compliance, they should be committed to 
increasing the level of trust that their citizens have on the government, as well as use their power to enforce 
compliance. This can be done by providing high quality of services and building high quality institutions. At the 
same time, tax authorities must beef-up their efforts to detect and punish evaders. If these two measures are 
undertaken and enforced, the result would be improvement in tax compliance among African countries. 
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